Anthropology in the Clinic: The Problem of Cultural Competency and How to Fix It by Kleinman, Arthur & Benson, Peter
PLoS Medicine  |  www.plosmedicine.org 1673
 Essay 
October 2006  |  Volume 3  |  Issue 10  |  e294
  C
ultural competency has become 
a fashionable term for clinicians 
and researchers. Yet no one can 
deﬁ  ne this term precisely enough to 
operationalize it in clinical training and 
best practices.
    It is clear that culture does matter in 
the clinic. Cultural factors are crucial 
to diagnosis, treatment, and care. 
They shape health-related beliefs, 
behaviors, and values [1,2]. But the 
large claims about the value of cultural 
competence for the art of professional 
care-giving around the world are simply 
not supported by robust evaluation 
research showing that systematic 
attention to culture really improves 
clinical services. This lack of evidence 
is a failure of outcome research to take 
culture seriously enough to routinely 
assess the cost-effectiveness of culturally 
informed therapeutic practices, not a 
lack of effort to introduce culturally 
informed strategies into clinical settings 
[3].
    Problems with the Idea of Cultural 
Competency
    One major problem with the idea of 
cultural competency is that it suggests 
culture can be reduced to a technical 
skill for which clinicians can be trained 
to develop expertise [4]. This problem 
stems from how culture is deﬁ  ned in 
medicine, which contrasts strikingly 
with its current use in anthropology—
the ﬁ  eld in which the concept of 
culture originated [5–9]. Culture is 
often made synonymous with ethnicity, 
nationality, and language. For example, 
patients of a certain ethnicity—such as, 
the “Mexican patient”—are assumed 
to have a core set of beliefs about 
illness owing to ﬁ  xed ethnic traits. 
Cultural competency becomes a series 
of “do’s and don’ts” that deﬁ  ne how 
to treat a patient of a given ethnic 
background [10]. The idea of isolated 
societies with shared cultural meanings 
would be rejected by anthropologists, 
today, since it leads to dangerous 
stereotyping—such as, “Chinese believe 
this,” “Japanese believe that,” and so 
on—as if entire societies or ethnic 
groups could be described by these 
simple slogans [11  –13]. 
    Another problem is that cultural 
factors are not always central to a case, 
and might actually hinder a more 
practical understanding of an episode 
(see Box 1). 
    Historically in the health-care 
domain, culture referred almost solely 
to the domain of the patient and 
family. As seen in the case scenario 
in Box 1, we can also talk about the 
culture of the professional caregiver—
including both the cultural background 
of the doctor, nurse, or social worker, 
and the culture of biomedicine 
itself—especially as it is expressed in 
institutions such as hospitals, clinics, 
and medical schools [14]. Indeed, the 
culture of biomedicine is now seen 
as key to the transmission of stigma, 
the incorporation and maintenance 
of racial bias in institutions, and the 
development of health disparities 
across minority groups [15–18].
    Culture Is Not Static
    In anthropology today, culture is 
not seen as homogenous or static. 
Anthropologists emphasize that culture 
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  Box 1. Case Scenario: Cultural 
Assumptions May Hinder 
Practical Understanding
    A medical anthropologist is asked by 
a pediatrician in California to consult in 
the care of a Mexican man who is HIV 
positive. The man’s wife had died of AIDS 
one year ago. He has a four-year-old son 
who is HIV positive, but he has not been 
bringing the child in regularly for care. 
The explanation given by the clinicians 
assumed that the problem turned on a 
radically different cultural understanding. 
What the anthropologist found, though, 
was to the contrary. This man had a near 
complete understanding of HIV/AIDS 
and its treatment—largely through the 
support of a local nonproﬁ  t organization 
aimed at supporting Mexican-American 
patients with HIV. However, he was a 
very-low-paid bus driver, often working 
late-night shifts, and he had no time 
to take his son to the clinic to receive 
care for him as regularly as his doctors 
requested. His failure to attend was not 
because of cultural differences, but rather 
his practical, socioeconomic situation. 
Talking with him and taking into account 
his “local world” were more useful than 
positing radically different Mexican 
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is not a single variable but rather 
comprises multiple variables, affecting 
all aspects of experience. Culture is 
inseparable from economic, political, 
religious, psychological, and biological 
conditions. Culture is a process 
through which ordinary activities and 
conditions take on an emotional tone 
and a moral meaning for participants. 
    Cultural processes include 
the embodiment of meaning in 
psychophysiological reactions [19], 
the development of interpersonal 
attachments [20], the serious 
performance of religious practices 
[21], common-sense interpretations 
[22], and the cultivation of collective 
and individual identity [23]. Cultural 
processes frequently differ within the 
same ethnic or social group because 
of differences in age cohort, gender, 
political association, class, religion, 
ethnicity, and even personality. 
    The Importance of Ethnography
    It is of course legitimate and highly 
desirable for clinicians to be sensitive 
to cultural difference, and to attempt 
to provide care that deals with cultural 
issues from an anthropological 
perspective. We believe that the optimal 
way to do this is to train clinicians in 
ethnography. “Ethnography” is the 
technical term used in anthropology 
for its core methodology. It refers to 
an anthropologist’s description of 
what life is like in a “local world,” a 
speciﬁ  c setting in a society—usually 
one different from that of the 
anthropologist’s world. Traditionally, 
the ethnographer visits a foreign 
country, learns the language, and, 
systematically, describes social patterns 
in a particular village, neighborhood, 
or network [24]. What sets this 
apart from other methods of social 
research is the importance placed on 
understanding the native’s point of 
view [25]. The ethnographer practices 
an intensive and imaginative empathy 
for the experience of the natives—
appreciating and humanly engaging 
with their foreignness [26], and 
understanding their religion, moral 
values, and everyday practices [27,28]. 
    Ethnography is different than 
cultural competency. It eschews the 
“trait list approach” that understands 
culture as a set of already-known 
factors, such as “Chinese eat pork, 
Jews don’t.” (Millions of Chinese are 
vegetarians or are Muslims who do 
not eat pork; some Jews, including the 
corresponding author of this paper, 
love pork.) Ethnography emphasizes 
engagement with others and with the 
practices that people undertake in their 
local worlds. It also emphasizes the 
ambivalence that many people feel as 
a result of being between worlds (for 
example, persons who identify as both 
African-American and Irish, Jewish and 
Christian, American and French) in a 
way that cultural competency does not. 
And ethnography eschews the technical 
mastery that the term “competency” 
suggests. Anthropologists and clinicians 
share a common belief—i.e., the 
primacy of experience [29–33]. The 
clinician, as an anthropologist of 
sorts, can empathize with the lived 
experience of the patient’s illness, and 
try to understand the illness as the 
patient understands, feels, perceives, 
and responds to it.
    The Explanatory Models Approach
    One of us [AK] introduced the 
“explanatory models approach,” 
which is widely used in American 
medical schools today, as an interview 
technique (described below) that 
tries to understand how the social 
world affects and is affected by illness. 
Despite its inﬂ  uence, we’ve often 
witnessed misadventure when clinicians 
and clinical students use explanatory 
models. They materialize the models 
as a kind of substance or measurement 
(like hemoglobin, blood pressure, or X 
rays), and use it to end a conversation 
rather to start a conversation. The 
moment when the human experience 
of illness is recast into technical disease 
categories something crucial to the 
experience is lost because it was not 
validated as an appropriate clinical 
concern [34]. 
    Rather, explanatory models 
ought to open clinicians to human 
communication and set their expert 
knowledge alongside (not over and 
above) the patient’s own explanation 
and viewpoint. Using this approach, 
clinicians can perform a “mini-
ethnography,” organized into a series 
of six steps. This is a revision of the 
Cultural Formulation included in the 
fourth edition of the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(DSM-IV) (see Appendix I in [35]) 
[36,37]. 
    A Revised Cultural Formulation
      Step 1: Ethnic identity.   The ﬁ  rst step 
is to ask about ethnic identity and 
determine whether it matters for the 
patient—whether it is an important 
part of the patient’s sense of self. As 
part of this inquiry, it is crucial to 
acknowledge and afﬁ  rm a person’s 
experience of ethnicity and illness. This 
is basic to any therapeutic interaction, 
and enables a respectful inquiry into 
the person’s identity. The clinician 
can communicate a recognition that 
people live their ethnicity differently, 
that the experience of ethnicity is 
complicated but important, and that 
it bears signiﬁ  cance in the health-care 
setting. Treating ethnicity as a matter 
of empirical evidence means that its 
salience depends on the situation. 
Ethnicity is not an abstract identity, 
as the DSM-IV cultural formulation 
implies, but a vital aspect of how life is 
lived. Its importance varies from case 
to case and depends on the person. It 
deﬁ  nes how people see themselves and 
their place within family, work, and 
social networks. Rather than assuming 
knowledge of the patient, which can 
lead to stereotyping, simply asking the 
patient about ethnicity and its salience 
is the best way to start. 
      Step 2: What is at stake?   The second 
step is to evaluate what is at stake as 
patients and their loved ones face an 
episode of illness. This evaluation may 
include close relationships, material 
resources, religious commitments, and 
even life itself. The question, “What is 
at stake?” can be asked by clinicians; 
the responses to this question will vary 
within and between ethnic groups, and 
  Box 2. The Explanatory Models 
Approach 
    •  What do you call this problem?
    •  What do you believe is the cause of 
this problem?
    •  What course do you expect it to take? 
How serious is it?
    •  What do you think this problem does 
inside your body?
    •  How does it affect your body and your 
mind?
    •  What do you most fear about this 
condition? 
    •  What do you most fear about the 
treatment?
    (Source: Chapter 15 in [38]) 
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will shed light on the moral lives of 
patients and their families.
      Step 3: The illness narrative.   Step 
3 is to reconstruct the patient’s 
“illness narrative” [38]. This involves 
a series of questions (about one’s 
explanatory model) aimed at acquiring 
an understanding of the meaning of 
illness (Box 2).
    The patient and family’s explanatory 
models can then be used to open up 
a conversation on cultural meanings 
that may hold serious implications for 
care. In this conversation, the clinician 
should be open to cultural differences 
in local worlds, and the patient should 
recognize that doctors do not ﬁ  t a 
certain stereotype any more than they 
themselves do. 
      Step 4: Psychosocial stresses.   Step 
4 is to consider the ongoing stresses 
and social supports that characterize 
people’s lives. The clinician records the 
chief psychosocial problems associated 
with the illness and its treatment (such 
as family tensions, work problems, 
ﬁ  nancial difﬁ  culties, and personal 
anxiety). For example, if the clinicians 
described in the case scenario in Box 1 
had carried out step 4, they could have 
avoided the misunderstanding with 
their Mexican-American patient. The 
clinician can also list interventions to 
improve any of the patient’s difﬁ  culties, 
such as professional therapy, self-
treatment, family assistance, and 
alternative or complementary medicine.
      Step 5: Inﬂ  uence of culture on 
clinical relationships.   Step 5 is to 
examine culture in terms of its 
inﬂ  uence on clinical relationships. 
Clinicians are grounded in the world 
of the patient, in their own personal 
network, and in the professional 
world of biomedicine and institutions. 
One crucial tool in ethnography is 
the critical self-reﬂ  ection that comes 
from the unsettling but enlightening 
experience of being between social 
worlds (for example, the world of the 
researcher/doctor and the world of the 
patient/participant of ethnographic 
research). So, too, it is important to 
train clinicians to unpack the formative 
effect that the culture of biomedicine 
and institutions has on the most 
routine clinical practices—including 
bias, inappropriate and excessive use 
of advanced technology interventions, 
and, of course, stereotyping. Teaching 
practitioners to consider the effects 
of the culture of biomedicine is 
contrary to the view of the expert as 
authority and to the media’s view that 
technical expertise is always the best 
answer. The statement “First do no 
harm by stereotyping” should appear 
on the walls of all clinics that cater 
to immigrant, refugee, and ethnic-
minority populations. And yet since 
culture does not only apply to these 
groups, it ought to appear on the walls 
of all clinics. 
      Step 6: The problems of a cultural 
competency approach.   Finally, step 6 
is to take into account the question 
of efﬁ  cacy—namely, “Does this 
intervention actually work in particular 
cases?” There are also potential 
side-effects. Every intervention has 
potential unwanted effects, and this 
is also true of a culturalist approach. 
Perhaps the most serious side-effect of 
cultural competency is that attention to 
cultural difference can be interpreted 
by patients and families as intrusive, 
and might even contribute to a sense 
of being singled out and stigmatized 
[3,11,12]. Another danger is that 
overemphasis on cultural difference 
can lead to the mistaken idea that if 
we can only identify the cultural root 
of the problem, it can be resolved. 
The situation is usually much more 
complicated. For example, in her 
inﬂ  uential book,   The Spirit Catches You 
and You Fall Down  , Ann Fadiman shows 
that while inattention to culturally 
important factors creates havoc in 
the care of a young Hmong patient 
with epilepsy, once the cultural issues 
are addressed, there is still no easy 
resolution [33]. Instead, a whole new 
series of questions is raised. 
    Determining What Is at Stake for 
the Patient
    The case history in Box 3 gives 
an example of how simply using 
culturally appropriate terms to explain 
people’s life stories helps the health 
professionals to restore a “broken” 
relationship and allows treatment to 
continue. This case is not settled, nor is 
it an example of any kind of technical 
competency. But there are two 
illuminating aspects of this case. First, it 
is important that health-care providers 
do not stigmatize or stereotype 
patients. This is a case study of an 
individual. Not all Chinese people ﬁ  t 
this life story, and many contemporary 
Chinese now accept the diagnosis of 
depression. Second, culture is not 
just what patients have; clinicians 
also participate in cultural worlds. A 
physician too rigidly oriented around 
the classiﬁ  cation system of biomedicine 
might ﬁ  nd it unacceptable to use lay 
classiﬁ  cations for the treatment. 
    For the late French moral 
philosopher Emmanuel Levinas, in 
the face of a person’s suffering, the 
ﬁ  rst ethical task is acknowledgement 
[39]. Face-to-face moral issues 
precede and take precedence over 
epistemological and cultural ones 
[40]. There is something more 
basic and more crucial than cultural 
competency in understanding the life 
of the patient, and this is the moral 
meaning of suffering—what is at stake 
for the patient; what the patient, at a 
deep level, stands to gain or lose. The 
explanatory models approach does not 
ask, for example, “What do Mexicans 
  Box 3. Case Scenario: The 
Importance of Using Culturally 
Appropriate Terms to Explain 
People’s Life Stories
    Miss Lin is a 24-year-old exchange 
student from China in graduate school in 
the United States, where she developed 
symptoms of palpitations, shortness 
of breath, dizziness, fatigue, and 
headaches. A thorough medical work-
up leaves the symptoms unexplained. A 
psychiatric consultant diagnoses a mixed 
depressive-anxiety disorder. Miss Lin 
is placed on antidepressants and does 
cognitive-behavioral psychotherapy, 
with symptoms getting better over a six-
week period; but they do not disappear 
completely. 
    Subsequently, the patient drops out 
of treatment and refuses further contact 
with the medical system. Anthropological 
consultation discovers that Miss Lin 
comes from a Chinese family in Beijing—
one of her cousins is hospitalized with 
chronic mental illness. So powerful is 
the stigma of that illness for this family 
that Miss Lin cannot conceive of the 
idea that she is suffering from a mental 
disorder, and refuses to deal with her 
American health-care providers because 
they use the terms “anxiety disorder” and 
“depressive disorder.” In this instance, 
she herself points out that in China 
the term that is used is neurasthenia 
or a stress-related condition. On the 
anthropologist’s urging, clinicians 
reconnect with Miss Lin under this label. 
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call this problem?” It asks, “What do 
you call this problem?” and thus a 
direct and immediate appeal is made 
to the patient as an individual, not as a 
representative of a group. 
  Conclusion
    What clinicians want to understand 
through the mini-ethnography is what 
really matters—what is really at stake 
for patients, their families, and, at 
times, their communities, and also what 
is at stake for themselves. If we were 
to reduce the six steps of culturally 
informed care to one activity that even 
the busiest clinician should be able to 
ﬁ  nd time to do, it would be to routinely 
ask patients (and where appropriate 
family members) what matters most to 
them in the experience of illness and 
treatment. The clinicians can then use 
that crucial information in thinking 
through treatment decisions and 
negotiating with patients.
    This is much different than cultural 
competency. Finding out what matters 
most to another person is not a 
technical skill. It is an elective afﬁ  nity to 
the patient. This orientation becomes 
part of the practitioner’s sense of self, 
and interpersonal skills become an 
important part of the practitioner’s 
clinical resources [41]. It is what Franz 
Kafka said “a born doctor” has: “a 
hunger for people” [42]. And its main 
thrust is to focus on the patient as an 
individual, not a stereotype; as a human 
being facing danger and uncertainty, 
not merely a case; as an opportunity 
for the doctor to engage in an essential 
moral task, not an issue in cost-
accounting [43].   
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